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A STRATEGY FOR RENEWING FRANCHISE NEGOTIATIONS IN
KOSOVO
MATTHEW V. Topic*
INTRODUCTION
Kosovo currently exists as a "political trusteeship" in which civil ad-
ministration is carried out through the United Nations Interim Administra-
tion Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK").l Prior to UNMIK's assumption of
authority, Kosovo existed as an autonomous province of Serbia, one of the
six Republics that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
("SFRY"). 2 UNMIK authority began in 1999 to address widespread human
rights abuses in Kosovo, both by the government of Serbia against ethnic
Albanians and by ethnic Albanian terror groups against Serbs in Kosovo.3
Economic development has been slow to emerge in Kosovo, and although
some progress has been made, Kosovo is far from becoming even a small
player in the world trade arena.4
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2006; B.A.,
Music, North Central College, 2000. Thank you to Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr., for his encourage-
ment and guidance, to Michelle Brunsvold and Jessica Kaiser for their edits and advice, and to Eileen
for her love and support.
1. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,401lthmtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1244(1999).
2. On July 4, 1992, the European Commission (now the EU) Arbitration Commission found that
the SFRY should be considered to have dissolved. Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to
Debts and Assets: The Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 355, 388 (2001). The Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") existed after the dissolution of the SFRY and before the creation of
the Union of Serbia and Montenegro ("USM") in 2002. Serbia and Montenegro agreed to form a loose
confederation for a period of three years, after which Montenegrins will vote on their desire to remain
federalized with Serbia. See Agreement on Principles of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro
Within the Framework of a Union of States (2002). For the full text, see http://www.-
reliefweb-intlw/rwb.nsf/O/c604a3782756fa27c1256b8100663089?OpenDocument&Click- (last visited
Jan. 6, 2005). Technically, Kosovo is a part of the USM, as the international community has reaffirmed
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res. 1244,
supra note 1. In the event that Montenegrins vote for independence, sovereignty rights over Kosovo
will revert to Serbia. See id. For the purposes of discussing trademark protection under Kosovar law,
however, this Note conceptualizes Kosovo as a separate entity.
3. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1.
4. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo, U.N. SCOR, at 15, U.N. Doc. S/2004/907 (2004).
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The presence of a McDonald's franchise provides economic hope to
the people of a developing region. 5 A group of Kosovar entrepreneurs re-
cently attempted to acquire a McDonald's franchise. 6 Their efforts, through
an attorney in the U.S., were fruitless. 7 McDonald's promptly informed
them that it would not convey any franchises for use in Kosovo for at least
five years.8 Further efforts to negotiate with McDonald's have been unsuc-
cessful.9 There will be no Big Macs in Kosovo for some time. Or will
there?
A technique sometimes used in negotiation is to take action that
prompts litigation and to use the impending litigation to persuade the op-
posing side to return to the bargaining table. 10 In order to be successful, the
litigation prompted by the action must be such that the opponent is unsure
whether it will be victorious in court. Renewed negotiations are unlikely if
the opponent is not threatened by the litigation because it is sure it will
succeed quickly.'" This Note considers whether unauthorized use of the
McDonald's mark by these Kosovar entrepreneurs is a viable way to per-
suade McDonald's to return to franchise negotiations.
This Note uses the term "unauthorized" to mean "without permis-
sion," as distinguished from "illegal" or "infringing." If a mark clearly
enjoys protection under trademark law, unauthorized use of that mark
would not only violate trademark law, but litigation against the infringer
would be too certainly successful to provide leverage towards renewed
negotiations. The purpose of this Note is to discuss whether, and to what
degree of certainty, McDonald's enjoys protection under trademark law
against unauthorized use in Kosovo. The author does not condone deliber-
ate and knowing violations of the law, but rather offers advice common in
the legal profession-whether conduct is in fact illegal. Further, there is
debate in the world community as to whether enforcement of trademarks in
developing nations is good policy. 12
5. MCDONALD'S CORP., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1996).
6. Interview with Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, in Chicago, I11.
(June 2004) [hereinafter Perritt Interview].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1636-37
(1986) (describing the "Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement" ("BATNA") concept in the context
of the regulatory rulemaking process).
11. See id.
12. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Propert Abroad: Toward a
New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 275 (1991). Kosovar reluctance to enforce McDonald's
alleged trademark rights could be justified for reasons of economic policy. Enforcement of rights
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Section I of this Note provides a discussion of the relevant principles
of trademark law. Section II explores the sources of Kosovar and U.S. fed-
eral and state laws that might provide protection against trademark in-
fringement in Kosovo, discusses the likely difficulties in interpreting those
laws in the unique Kosovar context, and examines the various approaches
that U.S. circuit courts of appeals have taken in applying U.S. trademark
law abroad. Section III addresses Kosovar, Yugoslav, and U.S. forums in
which McDonald's, or other similarly situated plaintiffs, might file suit.
Section IV discusses conflict of laws issues that McDonald's would face in
attempting to secure and enforce a judgment against the Kosovar entrepre-
neurs. This Note concludes that McDonald's does not enjoy certain protec-
tion of its mark under Kosovar law, and that application of U.S. trademark
law to activities in Kosovo is equally uncertain, making unauthorized use
of the McDonald's mark in Kosovo a potentially successful technique for
provoking new franchising negotiations.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK LAW
Trademarks, also called "marks," are words, names, symbols, devices,
or a combination of these elements that are used in commerce to identify or
distinguish products or services. 13 Trademark laws serve two primary pur-
poses. They protect consumers from the deception of counterfeit products
in the market and protect producers from others attempting to take advan-
tage of their labor.14 Virtually all nations have trademark laws. 15
Trademark rights 16 are acquired in the U.S. through actual use of the
particular mark in commerce, although registration of the mark with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office can, under certain circumstances, create
priority rights. 17 In most civil law nations, trademark rights result from the
registration process alone,' 8 although unused registered marks may be sub-
ject to revocation, which terminates trademark rights, through administra-
tive proceedings. 19 In the U.S., loss of acquired trademark rights requires a
allegedly enjoyed by foreign parties would both drain the limited resources of the Kosovar government
and deprive Kosovo of the economic benefits of the use of foreign marks. See id. at 281-82.
13. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:12 (4th
ed. 2004) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
14. Id. § 2:1.
15. Id. § 2:6.
16. This Note refers to "trademark rights" also as "mark protection" or "protection of the mark."
17. MCCARTHY, supranote t3,§§ 16:116:2.
18. Id- § 16:1
19. See infra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 (discussing revocation under Yugoslav law). If a mark is
"registered," the mark holder enjoys "trademark rights" in civil law countries, but does not enjoy rights
in the U.S. until the mark is actually used, at which point the mark is "protected."
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showing that the mark holder has ceased use of the mark in the U.S. and
does not intend to resume use, 20 but intent not to resume use is rebuttably
presumed after three years of non-use. 2 1
One who enjoys acquired trademark rights may bring a suit for in-
fringement against anyone who uses the protected mark without authoriza-
tion. The standard test for infringement is whether the use of the mark by
the party not enjoying the trademark rights has created a "likelihood of
confusion" in the market that tends to mislead consumers. 22
Also relevant to trademark law are the concepts of unfair competition
and famous mark doctrine (also known as well-known mark doctrine).
Unfair competition is an abstract concept that lacks a formal definition and
is best illustrated through examples. 23 Examples of unfair competition un-
der U.S. law include false representation or advertising, and use of confus-
ingly similar branding. 24 Famous marks-those with greater public
recognition-are generally entitled to greater protection.25
If the Kosovar entrepreneurs were to open an unauthorized "McDon-
ald's" in Kosovo, their conduct would certainly create a likelihood of con-
fusion. Their conduct would not be infringement, however, unless
McDonald's already enjoyed acquired trademark rights. McDonald's
would therefore need to show either that it enjoyed trademark rights under
Kosovar law, or that McDonald's rights under U.S. law were infringed by
conduct occurring entirely outside U.S. borders. This Note, therefore, ad-
dresses the certainty and likelihood of McDonald's success in establishing
either of those two methods of protection.
II. SOURCES OF LAW
If McDonald's brought suit against the Kosovar entrepreneurs,
McDonald's would need to point to a source of law that would grant it
protection from the Kosovars' unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark.
Both Kosovar and United States law might provide McDonald's such pro-
tection, but relief under either law is quite uncertain.
20. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 17:9.
21. Id. § 17:18.
22. Id. § 23:1.
23. Id. § 1:8.
24. Id. § 1:10.
25. Id. § 11:73.
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A. Kosovar Law
Under UNMIK regulation 1999/24,26 the applicable law in Kosovo
comes from several sources. Regulations promulgated by the Special Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations ("UNMIK regu-
lations") provide the primary law.27 When no law has been promulgated for
a given subject area, the laws in effect in Kosovo as of March 22, 1989,
apply.28 When subject matter is not covered by these first two sources of
law, a court or government body must apply any applicable Yugoslav law
enacted after March 22, 1989, so long as that law is not ethnically discrimi-
natory and complies with various international human rights instruments
that were adopted by regulation 1999/24.29
The absence or existence of the legal agencies that play a part in en-
forcing various laws ("legal infrastructure") would seem relevant in deter-
mining whether laws enacted before or after 1989 continue to "exist" and
can be applied. UNMIK regulations, however, do not address the issue of
legal infrastructure. This Note, therefore, speculates on the role of legal
infrastructure on the analysis of applicable Kosovar trademark law.
The Special Representative has not promulgated any substantive
trademark laws, 30 but UNMIK regulations do require Kosovo to enforce
any intellectual property rights enjoyed by foreign entities. 3 1 Thus, if there
26. On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 (Dec. 12, 1999).
27. Id. § 1.1(a).
28. Id. § 1.1(b). March 22, 1989 is significant because it was the last day before the Assembly of
Kosovo, with the majority of Kosovar Albanian delegates abstaining, voted to accept amendments to
the Yugoslav constitution that stripped Kosovo of most of the autonomy granted in the 1974 Constitu-
tion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Third Amended
Indictment, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, IC.T.Y., 81 (2002). The vote was declared passed despite the
absence of the necessary two-thirds majority. Id. For a partial reprint of the 1974 Constitution, see
SOCIALIST FED. REPUBLIC O- YUGOSLAVIA CONST. (1974), reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH
DOCUMENTS. FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 224 (Sne2ana Trifunovska ed., 1994).
29. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 § 1.2.
30. UNMIK has issued a regulation authorizing the Ministry of Trade and Industry to implement
rules protecting against the import and export of counterfeit products, but the scope of the regulation is
limited to external trade. See On the Promulgation of a Law Adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on
External Trade Activity, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIKIREG/2003/I 5 § 37 (May 12, 2003). UNMIK has also authorized the Department of Trade and
Industry (which is presumably the same institution as the Ministry of Trade and Industry) to issue
policy recommendations to UNMIK for the purpose, inter alia, of developing intellectual property
protection consistent with international standards. See On the Establishment of the Administrative
Department of Trade and Industry, UN. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2000/63 § 2.1(a)(iv) (Dec. 7, 2000). It does not appear that the Department of Trade and
Industry has issued any policy recommendations. In any event, no trademark laws have been promul-
gated by UNMIK.
31. On Foreign Investment in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/3 § 10 (Jan. 12, 2001) (requiring the authorities to enforce intellectual prop-
20051
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
is applicable trademark law in Kosovo, McDonald's would be entitled to
protection.
In 1989, the Law on the Protection of Inventions, Technical Improve-
ments and Distinctive Signs was in effect in the FRY, having been enacted
in 1981.32 In 1995, the FRY passed its Trademark Law, which repealed the
1981 Law and continues in effect today in the Union of Serbia and Monte-
negro ("USM"), essentially the remainder entity of the FRY.33 The provi-
sions of the 1981 and 1995 Laws differ in several relevant aspects. This
Note analyzes both laws because legal infrastructure issues, particularly the
role of the administrative Patent Office under both laws, could affect a
court's decision of whether to apply the 1981 Law, the 1995 Law, or
neither.
Because under regulation 1999/24 the laws in effect in Yugoslavia in
1989 take precedence over post-1989 laws, the 1981 Law should theoreti-
cally apply.34 If a court determined, however, that missing elements of the
legal infrastructure under the 1981 Law, such as the Patent Office, make
that law impossible to apply, it could determine that, in effect, no relevant
pre-1989 law exists. In that case, the court should apply the 1995 Law.35 If
the 1995 Law were found to be ethnically discriminatory, there would be
no trademark law in Kosovo at all.
McDonald's began operating in the SFRY in 1988 and presumably
registered its mark there prior to commencing its Yugoslav operations. 36
Under both the 1981 Law and the 1995 Law, however, McDonald's would
be obligated to use its registered mark or face possible revocation of its
mark registration and the corresponding protection from unauthorized
use.
3 7 For the purposes of determining whether McDonald's has a regis-
tered mark under Kosovar law, a court could consider either use or non-use
erty rights held by foreign parties). This regulation does not, however, define who are such authorities
or what rights they are to protect, and may simply be forward looking to enforcement in the future, after
new laws create such rights.
32. Law on the Protection of Inventions, Technical Improvements and Distinctive Signs (1981)
(Yugo.), reprinted in 21 INDUS. PROP. Text 1-001 (Sept. 1982) [hereinafter Yugoslav Trademark Law
of 1981].
33. Trademark Law, Official Gazette of the FRY, No- 15/95, 28/96 (1995) (Serb. & Mont.),
available at http://www.yupat.sv.gov.yu/propisi/Engl propisi/YU%20Trademark%20Law.pdf [herein-
after Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995].
34- See UNMIK/REG/1999/24 § 1.1.
35. Id. § 1.2-
36. Mark M. Nelson, Money Balks: Overseas Investors Find Serbian Leaders Corralling Econ-
omy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1996, at Al. Because FRY trademark records are not readily available in the
U.S. or in English, this Note assumes that McDonald's registered its mark before it began to use the
mark in the FRY.
37. Yugoslav Trademark Law of 1981, supra note 32, § 112 (revocation provision); Trademark
Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33, at art. 47 (revocation provision).
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in the SFRY, the FRY, and the USM, in which case McDonald's would be
protected from revocation, or use or non-use only in Kosovo, in which case
McDonald's mark could be subject to revocation.38
As the above discussion implies, McDonald's would face a myriad of
possibilities of what Kosovar law would apply in litigation against the
Kosovar entrepreneurs and how the law's provisions would be interpreted
in the unique Kosovo context of semi-independence. These possibilities are
discussed in the following sections.
1. Application of the 1981 Law
Under the 1981 Law, a registered trademark protects a sign that is in-
tended to distinguish goods or services in economic transactions. 39 The
McDonald's name, the "golden arches," and the labels attached to various
McDonald's products (such as the "Big Mac") are examples of such signs.
A mark holder enjoys the exclusive right to use the mark in economic
transactions. 40 The retail sale of fast food is an example of such an eco-
nomic transaction.
Registered marks are valid indefinitely under the 1981 Law, but the
mark holder has an obligation to use the mark.4 1 If, without justification, a
mark holder does not use a mark for a period of three years, any interested
party may seek revocation of the mark.42 Potential application of the revo-
cation provision to the McDonald's scenario is discussed below. First,
however, an analysis of the role of the Patent Office in the revocation proc-
ess under the 1981 Law is necessary, because a court could determine that
legal infrastructure issues involving the Patent Office render the 1981 Law
either inoperable or in need of judicial modification.
Under the 1981 Law, the Patent Office conducts administrative proce-
dures related to intellectual property.43 This includes both registration pro-
ceedings, which grant rights, 44 and revocation proceedings, which
terminate rights for non-use of the mark by the mark holder.45 Infringement
proceedings, however, are heard by "the competent court."46 Based on the
38. See infra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 (discussing in greater depth the revocation for non-use
issue).
39. Yugoslav Trademark Law of 1981, supra note 32, § 28.
40, Id. § 48.
41. Id. §§ 53, 112.
42. Id § 112.
43. Id. § 17.
44. Id. §§ 81, 87, 92.
45. Id. § 113.
46. Id. § 117.
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separate provisions and mechanisms for revocation and infringement in the
1981 Law, it appears that a defendant sued for trademark infringement
cannot argue non-use by the registered mark holder as an affirmative de-
fense to an infringement proceeding. Rather, a party that wishes to use an
unused mark registered by another must seek revocation at the Patent Of-
fice before using the unused mark for itself.
Because the Patent Office does not exist within the current Kosovar
government, and because the FRY repealed the 1981 Law and replaced it
with a new trademark law that created a new administrative agency to grant
and revoke trademark rights,47 there does not appear to be any formal
mechanism under the 1981 Law by which rights can be granted or revoked.
Without the legal infrastructure necessary to give full effect to the 1981
Law, a court might be reluctant to apply the 1981 Law, and might instead
turn to the 1995 Law. 48 A court could, however, adapt the 1981 Law to
account for the absence of the Patent Office by allowing non-use of the
mark by the registered mark holder as an affirmative defense to an in-
fringement suit against an unauthorized use of the mark. This would allow
the court to avoid having to choose between the potentially discriminatory
1995 Law or no law at all.49
The policy provisions of the 1981 Law would support a court's deci-
sion to hear non-use as an affirmative defense to infringement. The 1981
Law indicates a strong economic policy preference against non-use of reg-
istered marks by the mark holder. It states that rights granted under the
1981 Law "may not be used contrary to the interests of the society in hav-
ing the protected inventions and distinctive signs used."50 In fact, registra-
tion and indefinite non-use practices by foreign entities were primary
concerns that the 1981 Law addressed.51 A court could conceivably con-
sider this policy preference as sufficiently strong to support modification of
the precise procedural aspects of the 1981 Law and treat non-use as an
affirmative defense to infringement. 52
47. Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33, at art. 62.
48. See supra Section lI.A (discussing the hierarchy of sources of Kosovar law).
49. See supra Section lI.A.2.
50. Yugoslav Trademark Law of 1981, supra note 32, § 3.
51. V. Besarovi, The Recent Development of Yugoslav Legislation on Distinctive Signs, 21
INDUS. PROP. 251, 256 (Sept. 1982).
52. A court could also look to UNMIK regulation 2000/63, which authorizes the Department of
Trade and tndustry to develop policy recommendations for intellectual property standards consistent
with international standards. See supra note 30. There is not, however, a clear international consensus
on the appropriate scope of trademark protection in the developing world, which renders UNMIK
regulation 2000/63 of little policy guidance. See supra note 4. Nor has the author discovered any policy
recommendations issued by the Department of Trade and Industry.
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If a court did choose this option, it would then face multiple possibili-
ties in applying the revocation for non-use provision to the unique context
of semi-independent Kosovo. The court would need to decide whether it
should consider the registered mark holder's use or non-use in the FRY and
the USM, or only use or non-use in Kosovo itself.
A mark holder whose mark was registered under the 1981 Law and
who did not leave the mark unused for a three-year period in Kosovo would
certainly seem to enjoy continuing protection from unauthorized use if a
court applied the 1981 Law. Protection for McDonald's is less certain,
however, because McDonald's has not operated any restaurants in Kosovo.
If a court looked to use or non-use in the FRY and the USM, McDonald's
would be safe from an affirmative defense of non-use in its infringement
proceedings against the Kosovar entrepreneurs. If a court looked to use or
non-use only in Kosovo, the affirmative defense of non-use would likely be
meritorious.
A court might also need to consider whether advertising does or does
not qualify as "use" of the mark under the 1981 Law. If McDonald's adver-
tising reached into Kosovo from the FRY or reaches into Kosovo from the
USM, McDonald's could argue that such advertising constitutes use in
Kosovo and protects it against an affirmative defense of non-use, even if no
economic transactions actually occurred in Kosovo. It is not at all clear
whether a court would recognize such indirect use as sufficient under the
1981 Law.
Finally, the 1981 Law allows for revocation if the mark is unused
without justified reason. If non-use were allowed as an affirmative defense
to an infringement action in court, McDonald's could argue that the unset-
tled legal status of Kosovo and years of armed conflict in the region justify
the lack of use of its mark. If this argument were accepted, the Kosovar
entrepreneurs' affirmative defense of non-use would fail. Like other as-
pects of the non-use provision discussed above, it is not at all clear how a
court would interpret "without justified reason."
As this discussion indicates, many variables could affect the outcome
of an infringement action brought by McDonald's under the 1981 Law,
assuming that a court determined that the 1981 Law should apply. A court
would have multiple options available for resolving each of the variables.
McDonald's would face a great degree of uncertainty if it pursued litigation
against the Kosovar entrepreneurs under the 1981 Law. This uncertainty
increases the likelihood that McDonald's would return to the franchise
bargaining table instead of pursuing litigation.
20051
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2. Application of 1995 Law
If a court determined that Kosovo lacked the legal infrastructure to
apply the 1981 Law, UNMIK regulations would require the court to fill the
legal gap with any applicable law enacted in Yugoslavia after 1989, so long
as that law was not ethnically discriminatory. 53 In 1995, the FRY's (and
now the USM's) current Trademark Law was enacted.54 The 1995 Law
repealed the 1981 Law 55 but allowed registered marks to remain in effect
under the provisions of the 1995 Law.56 Thus, even if McDonald's did not
re-register its mark under the 1995 Law, its mark would be protected by
virtue of its registration under the 1981 Law.57 Marks under the 1995 Law
are only valid for ten years, after which the mark holder must renew
them. 58 Because FRY and USM trademark records were and are not avail-
able outside of those entities, this Note assumes that McDonald's exercised
proper diligence and re-registered its mark in Yugoslavia at the appropriate
ten-year intervals.
Under the 1995 Law, the Patent Office 59 renders decisions as to regis-
tration of trademark rights 60 and revocation of those rights for non-use. 61
Infringement actions are brought within the court system. 62 Like the 1981
Law, the 1995 Law provides for revocation when a mark is unused without
valid justification, but extends the period of time of non-use to five years. 63
The same issues and uncertainties regarding non-use as an affirmative
defense, the geographic area of use or non-use, and the meaning of "with-
53. UNMIKJREG/1999/24 § 1.2.
54. See Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33.
55. Id. at art. 62.
56. Id. at art. 60.
57. See supra note 36 (explaining assumption that McDonald's registered its mark prior to the first
use of the mark in 1988).
58. Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33, at art. 36.
59. The 1995 Trademark Law places competency for registration and revocation in the "compe-
tent federal body." Id. at arts. 7, 47. The precise name of this body is unclear from the text of the 1995
Law, but the 1995 Law requires that implementing regulations be issued. Id. at art. 61. English transla-
tions of those regulations are not available, but the competent federal body is presumably there named.
One article has analyzed revocation proceedings as involving both the Federal Bureau of Intellectual
Property and the Patent Office. The Eighth Annual International Review of Trademark Jurisprudence,
91 TRADEMARK REP. 245, 558-60 (2001). The official USM website provides copies of its intellectual
property laws on a webpage attributed to the Intellectual Property Office. Serbia and Montenegro
Intellectual Property Office, http://www.yupat.sv.gov.yu/eng index.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2005).
Because the federal body with revocation and registration responsibilities under the 1981 Law was
known as the Patent Office, this Note refers to the competent federal body described in the 1995 Law as
the Patent Office for the purpose of discussing registration and revocation proceedings.
60. Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33, at art. 47.
61. Id.
62. Id- at art- 53
63 Id. at art. 47.
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out valid reason" as analyzed for the 1981 Law would affect application of
the 1995 Law.64 Because the Patent Office created under the 1995 Law is
currently functioning in the USM, however, a court could elect to honor the
decisions of the USM Patent Office as to the registration and revocation of
rights and use the Patent Office decisions when hearing infringement ac-
tions. It is unclear whether the Patent Office in the USM would consider
trademark rights in Kosovo as a separate issue from rights in the USM,
especially given the hostilities between Kosovo and Serbia.
A court may only apply the 1995 Law, however, if the 1995 Law is
nondiscriminatory. 65 A court could determine that because the Patent Of-
fice is located in the USM, Kosovar citizens lack the practical ability to
access the Patent Office or would face discriminatory treatment if they
attempted to bring revocation proceedings. In that case, a court might de-
cline to apply the 1995 Law, leaving McDonald's no source of trademark
protection under Kosovar law. Alternatively, it might apply the 1995 Law
but modify it to allow non-use by the registered mark holder as an affirma-
tive defense to an infringement action against an unauthorized user of the
mark, thus removing the need for reliance on the Patent Office.
If a court did elect to treat non-use by the registered mark holder as an
affirmative defense to infringement, and looked only to use or non-use in
Kosovo, the five year time frame for non-use would not affect the analysis.
Because Kosovo's semi-independent status began in 1999 when the U.N.
assumed authority in Kosovo, the five-year deadline for use of McDonald's
mark in Kosovo has passed. If a court treated non-use as an affirmative
defense to infringement, McDonald's would be unable to demonstrate the
required use, and the Kosovar entrepreneurs would have a valid defense.
The 1995 Law does, however, specifically provide for advertising as a
use of the mark.66 If McDonald's advertising in the FRY or the USM
reached into Kosovo, McDonald's would be able to make a plausible ar-
gument that it did in fact use its mark in Kosovo. It is not clear, though,
whether the advertising would need to be directed at Kosovo or whether
indirect effects in Kosovo would suffice.
Even if a court revoked McDonald's mark under the 1995 Law for
non-use in Kosovo, McDonald's may still enjoy protection because the
1995 Law provides protection for famous marks. The 1995 Law does not
allow anyone to register a mark that is already famous in the USM, even if
64. See supra Section II.A.I.
65. UNMIKIREGI1999/24 § 1.2.
66. Trademark Law of the FRY, 1995, supra note 33, at art. 47.
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the owner of the famous mark has not registered the mark.67 It also pro-
vides that a famous mark may not be used to distinguish any goods, even
those not similar to the goods sold by the mark holder. 68 Thus, even if
McDonald's mark was left unregistered after revocation, McDonald's
would seemingly be protected through the famous mark provision of the
1995 Law. The Kosovar entrepreneurs could argue, however, that McDon-
ald's is not sufficiently famous in Kosovo to warrant famous-mark protec-
tion. The extent of McDonald's fame in Kosovo and the extent of fame
necessary under the 1995 Law are not clear.
Finally, in cases of intentional infringement, the 1995 Law authorizes
treble damages. 69 While the treble damages provision would not affect the
merits of an infringement case against the Kosovar entrepreneurs, it creates
an increased financial risk that the Kosovar entrepreneurs would be under-
taking if they adopted this negotiation-provoking strategy. It is not clear,
however, that intentional "unauthorized" use would be treated the same as
intentional "infringement." Intentional "infringement" implies that the de-
fendant was aware that the plaintiff's mark was in fact protected. It is not at
all clear that McDonald's does enjoy protection. The Kosovar entrepre-
neurs may be able to argue that they believed in good faith that the mark
was not protected and that they did not believe that their intentional "unau-
thorized" use would be "infringement."
Like the 1981 Law, the 1995 Law is wrought with unanswered ques-
tions when applied in the distinct Kosovar context. Regardless of which
law applied, McDonald's would face an uncertain outcome in litigation
against the Kosovar entrepreneurs based on either law. Indeed, it is quite
possible that a court would find that no Kosovar trademark law applies at
all. Thus, unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark by the Kosovar entre-
preneurs could provide valuable leverage in convincing McDonald's to
reconsider its decision not to convey any franchises for use in the Kosovar
market.
3. The Paris Convention
Before concluding the analysis of possible sources of Kosovar trade-
mark law, a brief discussion of the Paris Convention is warranted. The
Paris Convention is an international treaty by which signatories agree, inter
alia, to provide nationals of other signatory nations the same intellectual
property protections as domestic parties, and to provide certain minimum
67. Id. at art. 6. The owner of the famous mark may, of course, register the mark.
68. Id. at art. 34.
69. Id. at art. 49.
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levels of protection. 70 The FRY is a signatory to the Paris Convention and
is recorded as Serbia and Montenegro today. 7 1
The provisions of the Paris Convention would appear to offer McDon-
ald's its strongest protection against unauthorized use of its mark by the
Kosovar entrepreneurs through the Convention's doctrines of well-known
marks72 and unfair competition. 73 It is doubtful, however, that Kosovo is in
fact bound by the obligations assumed by the FRY under the Paris
Convention.
Because Kosovo is not in fact a state, it appears to lack the capacity to
be bound by international treaties. 74 The USM lacks any authority in Kos-
ovo, and therefore USM obligations under the Convention would no longer
seem to extend into Kosovo. 75 UNMIK has not taken action to bind Kos-
ovo under the Convention; nor has it issued regulations requiring Kosovo
to honor the terms of the Convention. 76 The Paris Convention, therefore,
represents only guidelines that a Kosovar court may or may not elect to
follow and does not make the outcome of McDonald's potential action
against the Kosovar entrepreneurs any more certain.
B. Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Lanham Act
Because the Kosovar entrepreneurs would be deliberately creating a
likelihood of confusion among Kosovar consumers as to the authenticity of
the entrepreneurs' "McDonald's," their actions would almost certainly be
considered infringement under the Lanham Act.77 The important issue,
however, is whether the Lanham Act would even apply to their actions
when those actions occur entirely outside the borders of the U.S. If the
Lanham Act does not apply, the entrepreneurs could not have violated it,
70. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 29:25.
71. World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Status on September 24, 2004, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf
(last visited Jan. 6, 2005) (Yugoslavia listed as Serbia and Montenegro).
72. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at the
Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, art. 6b
'
, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention].
73. Id. at art. 10"' .
74. C] On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIKJREG/1999/1 § 1.1 (July 25, 1999) ("All legislative and execu-
tive authority with respect to Kosovo... is vested in UNMIK.").
75. Id. UNMIK's authority in Kosovo is exclusive, leaving no room for Yugoslav authority.
76- See World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 71 (listing all signatories). Kosovo
does not appear on the list of signatories to the Paris Convention. Nor is it clear whether UNMIK has
the authority to obligate Kosovo to international treaties.
77. See supra Section I.
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and McDonald's would not enjoy any protection under the Act against the
Kosovar's unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark in Kosovo.
In 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.78
that the Lanham Act may be applied to activities occurring beyond the
borders of the United States. 79 The Court reasoned that Congress intended
that the Lanham Act be applied broadly to American commerce. 80 Accord-
ing to the Court, the Lanham Act was applicable when the defendant was a
U.S. citizen,81 the infringing acts committed abroad were essential steps in
a scheme that affected U.S. commerce, 82 and the defendant did not enjoy
rights abroad with which application of the Lanham Act would conflict. 83
The federal circuit courts have formulated different approaches in interpret-
ing Bulova to determine under what circumstances it is appropriate to apply
the Lanham Act extraterritorially. 84
1. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits follow a test for ex-
traterritorial application of the Lanham Act that tracks the Bulova language
closely. In Vanity Fair Mills Inc. v. Eaton Co.,85 the Second Circuit formu-
lated a three-part test that requires a court to consider the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen, (2) whether the allegedly in-
fringing conduct has a significant effect on U.S. commerce, and (3)
whether application of the Lanham Act would conflict with rights enjoyed
under foreign law. 86 The absence of one factor might defeat extraterritorial
application, and the absence of two factors certainly does.87
The defendant in Vanity Fair was a Canadian citizen who enjoyed
trademark rights to the "Vanity Fair" name under Canadian law. 88 The
plaintiff enjoyed identical rights under U.S. law and sought to enjoin the
defendant from using the mark in Canada. 89 The Vanity Fair court held that
it would be inappropriate to apply the Lanham Act to "foreign citizens
78. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
79. Id. at 287.
80. Id. at 282-83.
81. Id. at 284-86.
82. Id. at 286.
83. Id. at 289.
84. To be sure, McDonald's would face difficulties enforcing a successful U.S. judgment. These
difficulties are discussed infra in Section IV.C.
85. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
86. Id. at 642.
87. Id. at 643.
88. Id. at 637.
89 Id. at 637-38.
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acting under presumably valid trade-marks in a foreign country." 90 The
Fourth Circuit, 9 1 the Eleventh Circuit, 92 and a district court in the Sixth
Circuit 93 have all adopted the Vanity Fair test.
The Second Circuit later refined its test to stress the requirement that
U.S. commerce be significantly affected. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco
Globus International Co., Inc.,94 the Second Circuit added to the Vanity
Fair rule (the absence of two factors is fatal to extraterritorial application
of the Lanham Act) by holding that the absence merely of the second fac-
tor, significant effect on U.S. commerce, also defeats extraterritorial appli-
cation, even if the two other factors are met.95 The plaintiff in Atlantic
Richfield argued that use of the "ARCO" name by the defendant for the
sale of petroleum products infringed on the plaintiffs trademark rights
under U.S. law.96 The defendant was a U.S. company that sold petroleum
products in Russia and did not enjoy any trademark rights under Russian
law. 97 The Atlantic Richfield court held that even if the defendant is a U.S.
citizen and there is no conflict with rights enjoyed under foreign law, there
must still be a significant effect on U.S. commerce before the Lanham Act
should apply to extraterritorial conduct.98 The court further explained that
the "effects" factor could be satisfied when U.S. consumers are misled or
are caused to look less favorably upon a mark, when the defendant uses the
U.S. stream of commerce to compete with the domestic mark holder
abroad, or when the defendant's activities in the U.S. materially support
use of the mark abroad, and affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's Lanham
Act claims.99
The Eleventh Circuit, in International Caf, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6
International (U.S.A.), Inc.,100 elaborated on the third factor, conflict with
rights enjoyed by the defendant under foreign law. The plaintiff, a Leba-
nese corporation, alleged that the defendant, a U.S. corporation, entered
into a licensing agreement with the plaintiff that granted the plaintiff the
exclusive right to use the "Hard Rock Caf" mark in Lebanon, and that the
90. Id. at 643.
91. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994).
92. Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (1lth Cir.
2001).
93. Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (ND. Ohio 1999).
94. 150 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 193.
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id. at 191-92.
98. Id. at 193.
99. Id. at 193-94.
100. 252 F-3d 1274 (I Ith Cir. 2001).
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defendant nonetheless conveyed rights to use of the mark in Lebanon to
another party.101 The plaintiff filed suit for infringement of its trademark
rights both under the Lanham Act in the U.S. and under Lebanese law in
Lebanon. 102 The Eleventh Circuit held that the third factor, conflict with
rights enjoyed abroad, weighed against extraterritorial application because
the rights under Lebanese law were currently being litigated, such that a
contrary U.S. ruling could conflict with the potential outcome of the for-
eign litigation. 103
If McDonald's filed suit in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh Cir-
cuits, the Vanity Fair test likely would not be satisfied. The first factor
would not be met because the Kosovar entrepreneurs are not U.S. citizens.
The second factor would not seem to be met in the typical consumer trans-
action situation of consumers purchasing hamburgers at a McDonald's
outlet. U.S. consumers would not be misled or caused to view the McDon-
ald's mark less favorably as a result of unauthorized use in Kosovo. Indeed,
they likely would not even be aware of such use, and even if they were,
they likely would not worry whether their local McDonald's franchise was
authentic. Nor could McDonald's satisfy the second factor by showing that
the Kosovars supported the unauthorized use in Kosovo through U.S. ac-
tivities. Indeed, the Kosovars could completely control their potential li-
ability under this aspect of the second factor. So long as they did not
purchase materials in the U.S. for use in Kosovo or otherwise conduct any
activities in the U.S. to support their activities in Kosovo, the second factor
would not be satisfied.
Retail consumer transactions, however, are not the only transactions
that McDonald's could argue are relevant. McDonald's is also in the busi-
ness of conveying McDonald's franchises. If McDonald's regularly con-
veyed, in the U.S. market, franchises to use the McDonald's mark abroad,
the second factor might be met. U.S. consumers, defined as U.S. purchasers
of McDonald's franchises for use in Kosovo, would be caused to view the
McDonald's mark less favorably as a result of the unauthorized use of the
mark in Kosovo by the Kosovar entrepreneurs.
Of course, McDonald's decision not to enter the Kosovar market for
the next five years undercuts this argument. It shows that there is not any
market currently in the U.S. for Kosovar McDonald's franchises. It would
be counterintuitive to accept that there are consumers in a nonexistent mar-
ket and that franchisors are being caused to view the McDonald's mark less
101. Id. at 1276.
102. Id. at 1279.
103. Id.
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favorably as a result of unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark in Kos-
ovo. Further, McDonald's would have to demonstrate that it regularly con-
veys franchises in the U.S. for use abroad. In fact, McDonald's usually
does the opposite-it conveys franchises locally. 104
The third factor, potential conflict with rights enjoyed under foreign
law, likely would not be met because the very existence of any trademark
rights under Kosovar law is in question. 10 5 In sum, McDonald's likely
would not be able to demonstrate that the third factor would be met; fur-
ther, it would certainly not be able to satisfy the first factor. Most impor-
tantly, McDonald's probably would not be able to demonstrate the second
factor. As Atlantic Richfield court held, inability to demonstrate that the
second factor has been met is fatal to extraterritorial application of the
Lanham Act, 106 so McDonald's likely would not be successful if it filed
suit against the Kosovars in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh circuits.
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar, but not identical, test to the Vanity
Fair test in American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-operative
Ass 'n. 107 Both the plaintiff and defendant in American Rice were U.S. cor-
porations that sold rice in Saudi Arabia, as well as in the U.S. and other
foreign countries. 108 The plaintiff argued that the Lanham Act should apply
to the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark in Saudi Arabia. 10 9
The American Rice court found the second factor, effect on U.S.
commerce, satisfied. The infringing sales occurred entirely abroad, but the
defendant produced, packaged, and transported the infringing product
within the U.S. The court found that the infringement diverted the U.S.
plaintiffs foreign sales away from the plaintiff and toward the defendant,
even though the plaintiff showed no U.S. confusion or adverse affect upon
the mark. ' 10
104. Although the author would need proper discovery to determine McDonald's practices in this
regard, the attorney who represented the Kosovar entrepreneurs in the initial franchise negotiations was
directed by McDonald's U.S. headquarters to McDonald's Europe. Perritt Interview, supra note 6. The
decision not to convey a franchise to the Kosovar entrepreneurs was actually expressed to the Kosovars
by McDonald's Europe. The decision was presumably made by McDonald's Europe as well. This
indicates that the market for Kosovar McDonald's franchises is, at the very broadest, European.
105. See supra Section II.A.
106. Ati. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., Inc., 150 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1998).
107. 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
108. Id. at410.
109. Id. at 412.
110. Id. at 414-15.
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The American Rice court also interpreted the third factor, conflict with
defendant's foreign rights, in contradiction to the Eleventh Circuit in Inter-
national Caf6. The American Rice court found that the third factor was
satisfied, even though the defendant's rights under Saudi law were still
being litigated and even though the defendant had failed to show that it
possessed a superior right to that of the plaintiff."' Finally, unlike the At-
lantic Richfield court, the American Rice court held that that absence of one
factor is not dispositive and that the factors are nonexclusive. 112
Because the Kosovars are not U.S. citizens, the first factor would
weigh against application of the Lanham Act in the Fifth Circuit. The sec-
ond factor also would weigh against extraterritorial application. The
American Rice court looked to both the loss of foreign sales and the defen-
dant's activities within the U.S. in determining that the second factor was
satisfied. Because McDonald's does not operate in Kosovo, it would not be
able to argue that it had lost any sales in Kosovo. As discussed above,
McDonald's likely would not succeed in arguing that the relevant U.S.
market is sales of franchises, and not hamburgers. 13 So long as the Kos-
ovars avoid any activities in the U.S. in support of their Kosovar opera-
tions, the second factor should not apply.
The third factor would weigh in favor of application of the Lanham
Act. The Kosovar defendants would at best be able to show that their rights
under Kosovar law are unsettled and would be unable to demonstrate that
they have Kosovar trademark rights superior to that of McDonald's.114
It would therefore appear that under the Fifth Circuit's test, the
Lanham Act should not apply because McDonald's would not be able to
satisfy two of the three factors. The nonexclusivity of the Fifth Circuit test,
however, makes the issue unclear. A Fifth Circuit court might determine
that the uncertainty of Kosovar trademark law protection would warrant
application of the Lanham Act to protect U.S. mark holders. Because nei-
ther the Fifth Circuit nor any district courts within the Fifth Circuit have
elaborated on the nonexclusive nature of the Fifth Circuit test, it is difficult
to predict accurately how the Fifth Circuit would treat this situation.
McDonald's might have more success in the Fifth Circuit than in the
Second, Fourth, Sixth, or Eleventh circuits, but the result is still question-
able. Because relief through litigation need only be sufficiently uncertain to
make unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark a valid negotiation-
Ill. Id. at 415-16.
112. Id.at414.
113. See supra Section 11.B.1.
114. See supra Section II.A.
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provoking technique, the mere possibility of liability in the Fifth Circuit
should not deter the Kosovars from this approach.
3. Ninth and First Circuits
The Ninth Circuit has taken an approach to extraterritorial application
of the Lanham Act modeled after its own test for applying the Sherman Act
extraterritorially. The approach is best articulated in Star-Kist Foods, Inc.
v. P.J. Rhodes & Co. 115 The plaintiff in Star-Kist was a U.S. corporation
that had been in a distribution agreement with the defendant, which was
also a U.S. corporation. 116 The distribution agreement allowed the defen-
dant to use the plaintiffs mark, which was protected under U.S. and Phil-
ippine law, on products sold by the defendant in the Philippines.I1 7 After
the agreement was terminated, the defendant continued to use the mark in
the Philippines and commenced an action there to have the plaintiffs mark
registration canceled. 118 The plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. to enjoin the
defendant from using the mark in the Philippines. 119 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's injunction, which was limited in scope to sales in
the U.S. and products exported from the U.S., and which did not affect
products both manufactured and sold outside the U.S.120
The Ninth Circuit test requires that: (1) there be some effect on
American foreign commerce, (2) the effect is sufficiently great to present a
cognizable injury to plaintiffs under the federal statute, and (3) the interests
of and links to American foreign commerce be sufficiently strong in rela-
tion to those of other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial au-
thority. 121 The third factor in the test is determined by weighing seven
additional subfactors: (a) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
(b) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations, (c) the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, (d) the relative signifi-
cance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, (e)
the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, (f) the foreseeability of such effect, and (g) the relative impor-
115. 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985). The First Circuit has not addressed the issue, but a district
court in the First Circuit has used the Ninth Circuit test. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Sebelen, 930 F. Supp. 720,
723 (D.P.R. 1996).
116. Star-Kist, 769 F.2d at 1394-95.
117. Id. at 1395.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1395, 1398.
121. Id. at 1395.
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tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as com-
pared with conduct abroad.122
The Ninth Circuit has held that a loss of foreign sales and revenue by
a U.S. plaintiff satisfies the first factor. 123 The second factor essentially
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the effects have resulted from
activities that violate federal law, such as infringement under the Lanham
Act. 124 Although McDonald's could satisfy the second factor by showing
that the Kosovar entrepreneurs have created a likelihood of confusion as to
the authenticity of the Kosovar "McDonald's,"'125 McDonald's could show
that it has lost any foreign sales or revenue. 126
The third factor of the Ninth Circuit test requires combined analysis of
the several subfactors. Subfactor (a), the degree of conflict with foreign law
or policy, weighs against application of the Lanham Act. In considering the
weight of this subfactor, the Ninth Circuit has considered not only whether
there is or could potentially be a conflict with foreign law or policy, but
also the degree of conflict.12 7 If revocation proceedings began in the USM
and resulted in the loss of McDonald's trademark rights under Kosovar
law, 128 a U.S. decision granting protection would be in sharp contrast to the
Kosovar decision, which weighs strongly against application of the
Lanham Act. In fact, the Ninth Circuit held in Star Kist that this factor
alone was strong enough to deny extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Act if the remaining factors did not require a contrary result.' 29 If no pro-
ceedings began, there could still be a potential conflict with Kosovar pol-
icy. Although Kosovar intellectual property and international economic
policy are not at all clear, there exists the potential for a strong conflict with
application of the Lanham Act should Kosovo pursue a policy favoring
cancellation of all marks previously held under FRY law. Finally, the Kos-
ovar entrepreneurs could wait to bring revocation proceedings in Kosovo
until the U.S. mark holder brought suit in the U.S., thus providing itself
with a strong factor against application of the Lanham Act. 130
122. Id.
123. Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1992).
125. See supra Section 1.
126. See supra Section I1.B.I (McDonald's does currently operate in Kosovo, and has therefore not
lost any hamburger sales; nor has McDonald's created a U.S. market for Kosovar franchises).
127. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
128. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the possibility of revocation proceedings in the FRY and
the USM).
129. Star-Kist, 769 F.2d at 1396.
130. See supra Section II.A.
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Subfactor (b) weighs against application of the Lanham Act because
the Kosovar entrepreneurs are not U.S. citizens. Alternatively, this subfac-
tor is perhaps neutral because McDonald's is a U.S. corporation.131
Subfactor (c), the likelihood of enforcement by either state, weighs
against applying the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit has considered this
factor in support of application of the Lanham Act when the U.S. possesses
a superior ability to enforce the eventual judgment, such as when the de-
fendants are U.S. citizens. 132 The U.S. would have little ability to enforce
an injunction in Kosovo and would be able to enforce a money judgment
only to the extent that the Kosovar infringers have assets in the U.S.133
Subfactor (d), the relative effects on U.S. and foreign commerce, does
not support application of the Lanham Act. Only foreign consumers would
be misled by the infringing activity, and the potential economic losses or
gains by the U.S. or Kosovar parties likely would be similar or equal and
inversely related. If the U.S. mark holder were engaged in the sale of fran-
chises or licenses to sell the protected product in Kosovo, however, and
conveyed those franchises or licenses in the U.S. market, the potential ef-
fects in the U.S. might outweigh the potential effects in Kosovo.
Subfactors (e) and (f), specific intent to harm U.S. commerce and
foreseeability of the effect on U.S. commerce, would depend on the par-
ticular circumstances of the infringement. If the Kosovar entrepreneurs
deliberately infringed the McDonald's mark in an effort to take advantage
of McDonald's popularity, intent to harm the U.S. mark holder's foreign
sales of goods produced abroad could be inferred. The defendant must in-
tend to hurt U.S. commerce, however, not merely foreign commerce by a
U.S. party.134 Because McDonald's cannot likely show any effect on U.S.
commerce, 135 subfactors (e) and (f) do not support application of the
Lanham Act to unauthorized use of the McDonald's mark by the Kosovar
entrepreneurs in Kosovo.
Subfactor (g), the relative importance of the activities in the U.S. and
abroad in relation to the alleged violations, would weigh against application
of the Lanham Act. All allegedly infringing activity would occur in
Kosovo.
13 1. See Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 556 (9th Cir. 1992) (weighing
the nationality factor in favor of Lanham Act application when all parties involved were either U.S.
citizens or residents).
132. Id. at 557.
133. See infra Section IV.C.
134. Marnatech, 970 F.2d at 557 (discussing activities directed at U.S. commerce).
135. See supra Section II.B. I (U.S. consumers of hamburgers would not be affected by unauthor-
ized use in Kosovo, and McDonald's cannot show a U.S. market for Kosovar franchises).
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The majority of the subfactors indicate that Kosovar interests out-
weigh U.S. interests. Most importantly, there would exist the potential for
conflict with Kosovar law or policy, which alone would defeat McDonald's
attempt to have the Lanham Act applied to the Kosovars actions in Kosovo.
Further, McDonald's would not be able to demonstrate any effect on its
Kosovar commerce because it does not engage in any such commerce. It is
very unlikely that McDonald's would enjoy protection under the Lanham
Act if it brought suit in the Ninth or First circuits.
4. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has not explicitly formulated a test for extraterri-
torial application of the Lanham Act but has essentially followed the Vanity
Fair test.136 A district court in the Seventh Circuit, however, has recently
used a hybrid test based on both the Vanity Fair test and the Ninth Circuit
test, whereby the effect on U.S. commerce factor of the Vanity Fair test is
measured through the seven subfactors of the third factor of the Ninth Cir-
cuit test. 137 The district court further held that there is a strong presumption
against application of the Lanham Act to foreign citizens acting abroad; 138
that despite the lack of actual conflict with foreign law, the potential for
conflict makes that factor neutral; 139 and that a multinational corporation
cannot claim that its multinational nature makes an effect on its foreign
commerce an effect on its domestic commerce. 140 If this trend continues in
the Seventh Circuit, extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act against
Kosovar entrepreneurs would be even less likely in the Seventh Circuit
than elsewhere. 141
C. U.S. State Laws
The vast majority of U.S. states have trademark laws that follow the
Model State Trademark Bill. 142 The Model Bill's provisions are largely the
same as those of the Lanham Act with respect to acquisition of trademark
rights and the test for infringement. 143 Because the extraterritorial reach of
136. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1973).
137. Alcar Group, Inc. v. Corporate Performance Systems, Ltd, 109 F. Supp. 2d 948, 951 (N.D. Ill.
2000)_
138. Id. at 950.
139. Id. at 951.
140. Id. at 951-52.
141. The Third, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. circuits have not addressed extraterritorial application of
the Lanham Act.
142. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 22:5.
143. Id.
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state trademark laws is no greater than that of the Lanham Act, state trade-
mark laws would not increase the likelihood of McDonald's relief.]44
III. FORUMS
McDonald's could potentially bring suit against the Kosovar entrepre-
neurs in a Kosovar, USM, or U.S. state or federal court. Regardless of
which forum McDonald's chose, it would face difficulties and uncertainty
in its litigation.
A. Kosovo
Kosovo has a functioning court system that includes the Supreme
Court of Kosovo, District Courts, Municipal Courts, and Minor Offense
Courts.145 Because UNMIK has promulgated no procedural rules, Yugo-
slav procedural rules in effect in 1989 continue to apply. 146 An analysis of
those rules is unnecessary, however, because the trademark laws them-
selves provide sufficient procedural guidelines for the purposes of this
Note.
Both the 1981 Law and the 1995 Law allow foreign holders of marks
registered in the FRY to bring infringement proceedings in Yugoslav
courts. 147 A Kosovar court would therefore be an appropriate forum for
claims based on either the 1981 Law or the 1995 Law.
Although Kosovo may seem a logical forum for McDonald's to bring
suit against the Kosovar entrepreneurs, McDonald's would face significant
difficulties if it brought suit in Kosovo. There is an extensive backlog of
cases in the Kosovar court system that would prevent McDonald's from
obtaining prompt relief.148 McDonald's may not be able to enjoin the Kos-
ovars through the Kosovar court system from use of the McDonald's mark
until after McDonald's had planned to enter the Kosovar market.
149
There has also been substantial confusion and unpredictability in the
Kosovar courts in determining which law to apply when there has not been
any law promulgated through UNMIK relevant to the subject matter of the
144. See Atl. Richfield v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., Inc., 150 F.3d 189, 194 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998).
145. On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, U.N. Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 § 9.4.4 (May 15, 2001).
146. See UMMIK/REG/1999/24.
147, See supra Section II.A.
148. OMBUDSPERSON INST. IN Kosovo, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 12-13 (July 12, 2004) [herein-
after OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT].
149. See supra Introduction,
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Suit.150 This would be significant to McDonald's because its prospects for
relief may depend on which trademark law, if any, applies and how that
law is interpreted.
B. The USM
McDonald's could also bring an infringement claim in the USM under
the 1995 Law, alleging that the USM legal system retains jurisdiction over
Kosovo. The existence of a Kosovar legal system under the auspices of the
United Nations, however, would seem to preclude any jurisdiction of the
USM legal system in Kosovo, unless the infringement affected the USM
proper. 151
Even if a USM court asserted jurisdiction, McDonald's would be left
without a meaningful remedy unless the Kosovars had assets in the USM
against which McDonald's could levy, because a Kosovar court likely
would not enforce a USM judgment. 152
C. United States
Assuming that McDonald's could establish personal jurisdiction in the
U.S.,153 a U.S. federal court might be its preferable forum. McDonald's
would face much shorter delays than it would in Kosovo, and a U.S. court
likely would be more sympathetic to McDonald's case than would a Kos-
ovar court. McDonald's might, however, face forum non conveniens issues
in a U.S. federal court, which might result in the dismissal of its suit. 154
U.S. state court would also be an option for McDonald's but would present
the same jurisdiction and forum non conveniens problems.
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict of laws analysis addresses the concerns that arise when mul-
tiple states or nations may have jurisdiction over a given claim.155 Choice
of law, jurisdiction, and judgment enforcement are implicated in conflict of
laws analysis.
150. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 148, at 8-9.
151. See UNMIK/REG/1999/1.
152. See infra Section IV.C.
153. See infra Section IV.B.
154. See infra Section IV.C.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
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A. Choice of Law
U.S. federal courts have not undertaken choice of law analyses be-
tween the Lanham Act and foreign law. 156 They have dismissed trademark
actions entirely when the test for extraterritorial application of the Lanham
Act indicates that Lanham does not apply rather than retain the case and
apply the relevant foreign law. 157
Although it is conceivable that a USM or Kosovar choice of law rule
would require its courts to apply U.S. law, such a result is unlikely when
the alleged infringement occurs within the USM or Kosovo. Thus, a USM
or Kosovar court likely would apply its own trademark laws.
B. Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
Personal jurisdiction would seem to exist in Kosovo because the de-
fendants are Kosovar citizens. 158 Personal jurisdiction in the USM might
exist if the Kosovar entrepreneurs have sufficient contacts with the USM,
such as regular travel there. 159
USM or Kosovar law likely would apply in USM or Kosovar
courts, 160 and most relevant evidence would be in the USM or Kosovo. 161
Therefore, no forum non conveniens issues would seem to be implicated in
USM or Kosovar court proceedings. 162
Personal jurisdiction would exist in the U.S. if the Kosovar entrepre-
neurs have sufficient contacts with the U.S., but those contacts would be
difficult to establish because the Kosovar entrepreneurs do not regularly
156. See Pamela E. Kraver & Robert E. Purcell, Application of the Lanham Act to Extraterritorial
Activities: Trend Toward Universality or Imperialism?, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 115
(1995).
157. Id. Theoretically, McDonald's could sue in state court and argue that state choice of law
analysis points towards Kosovar law. The Kosovars could, however, simply remove the case to federal
court on diversity grounds and seekforum non conveniens dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000); see
infra Section V.B. The application of uncertain Kosovar law would almost certainly warrantforum non
conveniens dismissal. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (where a court must "untan-
gle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself," forum non conveniens dismissal may be
warranted).
158. UNMIK has not promulgated any laws on civil procedure in Kosovo. Therefore, pre-1989
FRY procedural law would apply. UNMIK/REG/1999/24. The author was unable to locate any trans-
lated versions of FRY procedural law. This Note therefore assumes that FRY procedural law grants
personal jurisdiction over domestic citizens.
159. See id. This Note assumes that regular contact with the USM would warrant personal jurisdic-
tion. If this assumption is incorrect, McDonald's potential for relief would be diminished.
160. See supra Section IV.A.
161. Perritt Interview, supra note 6.
162. Assuming that FRY procedural law even recognizesforum non conveniens doctrine. See supra
note 158.
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conduct business in the U.S.163 Alleged infringement in Kosovo that causes
foreseeable injury in the U.S. is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdic-
tion. 164 McDonald's would instead need to base jurisdiction on failed fran-
chise or licensing negotiations. Those negotiations need not be conducted
in person in the U.S. 16 5 so long as they result in continuing obligations with
McDonald's as a resident of the forum state. 166 Because the negotiations
between the Kosovar entrepreneurs and McDonald's ended quickly and
without any resulting obligations, personal jurisdiction in the U.S. over the
Kosovars is unlikely. McDonald's may instead need to base jurisdiction on
personal service within the U.S., which the Kosovars could easily defeat by
remaining outside the U.S. once the unauthorized use of the McDonald's
mark has begun.
If a federal court applied the Lanham Act and McDonald's suit pro-
ceeded in federal court, McDonald's would face forum non conveniens
obstacles. Evidence of the alleged infringement would be located almost
entirely within Kosovo, and a U.S. court would be forced to untangle the
uncertainty of Kosovar trademark law.167 If McDonald's sued first in Kos-
ovo and a Kosovar court determined that no trademark law exists in pre-
sent-day Kosovo, however, the complete lack of an available remedy in the
Kosovar forum would make forum non conveniens dismissal unwar-
ranted. 168 The delays in the Kosovar legal system, however, make it ex-
tremely unlikely that McDonald's would seek relief first in Kosovo. 169
C. Enforcement of Judgments
Judgment enforcement would present difficulties for McDonald's in
all forums. A U.S. court would only be able to enforce a money judgment
to the extent that the Kosovars have U.S. assets. European governments are
often hesitant to enforce U.S. judgments that apply to conduct occurring
outside the U.S. Given the history of armed conflict and animosity between
Kosovo and Serbia, neither Kosovo nor the USM is likely to enforce the
other's judgments.
163. Perritt Interview, supra note 6.
164. See Burger King Corp. v. Rud2ewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
165. Id- at 476 (allowing jurisdiction despite lack of physical contacts with forum state).
166. Id.
167. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (noting that location of witnesses and
evidence are factors to consider to determine the propriety of dismissal forforum non conveniens); see
also supra note 157.
168. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (noting that lack of clearly inadequate
remedy in alternate forum weighs in favor of dismissal forforum non conveniens).
169. See supra Section III.A.
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CONCLUSION
Should the Kosovar entrepreneurs elect to pursue this strategy for re-
newing negotiations with McDonald's, their journey would not be without
potential peril. McDonald's is well-known for vigorous protection of its
marks worldwide 170 and may decide to pursue its legal options regardless
of the uncertainty of its relief. The nature of McDonald's protection from
the Kosovars' unauthorized use is uncertain and could very well result in
liability for the Kosovars. Further, this course of action may imperil any
hopes of a future business relationship with McDonald's.
Yet the strategy also offers real hope for success. McDonald's would
almost certainly lack the ability to establish personal jurisdiction in the
United States and would face great uncertainty in the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Lanham Act and forum non conveniens areas. McDonald's,
therefore, likely would be forced to litigate in Kosovo. Kosovar trademark
law is anything but clear, and the Kosovar legal system is fraught with
delay and uncertainty. If the Kosovars could show in the interim that a
market for Big Macs exists in Kosovo and that they have the ability to sat-
isfy that market, McDonald's may decide to forgo uncertain legal relief for
a demonstrably profitable business venture. Most importantly, should the
Kosovar entrepreneurs succeed, the Kosovar economy would enjoy an
infusion of both capital and hope, and take a critical step towards
development.
170. See Cris Larano, McDonald's Wins Philippine Suit Over Trademark, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug.
25, 2004, at A2 (describing sixteen year court battle in the Philippines).
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